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ABSTRACT  
   
Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) whose observed personal option-holding 
patterns are not consistent with theoretical predictions are variously described as 
overconfident or optimistic. Existing literature demonstrates that the investment and 
financing decisions of such CEOs differ from those of CEOs who do not exhibit such 
behavior and interprets the investment and financing decisions by overconfident or 
optimistic CEOs as inferior. This paper argues that it may be rational to exhibit behavior 
interpreted as optimistic and that the determinants of a CEO’s perceived optimism are 
important. Further, this paper shows that CEOs whose apparent optimism results from 
above average industry-adjusted CEO performance in prior years make investment and 
financing decisions which are actually similar, and sometimes superior to, those of 
unbiased CEOs. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Since the articulation of the principal-agent problem it has been widely accepted that 
firms are not necessarily run in the best interests of their owners. The disproportionate 
impact of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) on both the behavior and the performance 
of the firm has prompted research in corporate finance to better understand why CEOs 
behave as they do. Agency problems occur when the interests of the CEO and the 
shareholders diverge and the CEO can intentionally follow policies that further his own 
interests at the expense of those of the shareholders. A different line of research considers 
how a CEO’s personal bias may cause him to unintentionally act against the best interests 
of the shareholders even in the absence of any deliberate attempt to further his own 
advantage. Hirshleifer (2001) presents an overview of biases which can affect 
investment. Two such biases in the literature are optimism about likely outcomes and a 
CEO’s overconfidence in the precision of his information. The literature is however not 
always consistent in its use of the terms “overconfidence” and “optimism”. This paper 
follows the traditional approach of Hackbarth (2008), which defines optimistic agents as 
predicting “that favorable future events are more likely than they actually are” and 
overconfident agents as believing “that they have more precise knowledge about future 
events than they actually have.” In short, optimists overestimate expected values, and 
overconfident agents underestimate risk. 
There is a broad and growing literature in which the personal option-holding patterns of 
CEOs are used to identify CEOs with an “upward bias in the assessment of future 
outcomes” (Malmendier & Tate (2005a)). The bias is labelled overconfidence, by authors 
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who wish to distinguish a CEO’s tendency to overestimate his personal attributes and 
outcomes from a tendency to overestimate exogenous outcomes, and as optimism, by 
authors who wish to distinguish it from the tendency to underestimate risk. The bias is 
generally claimed to be present when a CEO fails to exercise exercisable options until the 
final year of the options or when a CEO fails to exercise exercisable options exceeding a 
threshold in-the-moneyness (ITM). Such behavior has been shown to be associated with a 
variety of negative behaviors. Malmendier & Tate (2005a, 2008) find that a biased 
CEO’s reluctance to raise external financing makes his investment decisions more 
sensitive to the availability of internal funds. In addition, CEOs subject to this bias 
engage in more mergers and acquisitions and that the market reacts less favorably to the 
announcement of their acquisitions. Deshmukh, Goel & Howe (2013) finds that a biased 
CEO’s preference for internal financing causes the CEO to pay lower dividends but the 
dividend policy deviates less when the firm has growth opportunities. However, there are 
theoretical and empirical findings demonstrating positive consequences of CEO 
optimism. Hirshleifer, Low & Teoh (2012) shows biased CEOs in innovative industries 
are more successful at investing in innovation. Campbell, Gallmeyer, Johnson, 
Rutherford & Stanley (2011) claims there is an optimal level of CEO optimism and finds 
that “CEOs with relatively low or high optimism face a higher probability of forced 
turnover than moderately optimistic CEOs face.” While these behavioral distortions have 
been identified and well documented, it is less well known how CEOs become subject to 
the optimism bias and whether inter-temporal variation in the exhibition of this bias can 
provide information about its causes and the resultant quality of a CEO’s decisions. 
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This paper considers whether seemingly optimistic behaviors might sometimes be an 
unbiased response to short-term conditions and therefore examines the annual variation in 
a CEO’s measured optimism rather than optimism as a permanent characteristic. 
Information on CEOs’ option-holdings found in Compustat’s Execucomp database is 
used to estimate the average in-the-moneyness of unexercised exercisable options as a 
measure of a CEO’s optimism. Concentrating on short term variation in optimism allows 
the consideration of the determinants of changes in optimism and the classification of 
optimistic CEOs into distinct groups. The existing literature suggests that, as a whole, 
CEOs who exhibit optimistic option-holding behaviors are likely to implement sub-
optimal and value-destroying investment and financing decisions. Van den Steen (2004) 
shows how “choice-driven overoptimism” can result from rational behavior under 
uncertainty, but the CEO’s choice is still ex post incorrect, in that it was the result of 
inaccurate expectations. Optimistic option-holding behaviors essentially identify CEOs 
whose expectations of the future value of the firm are more positive than those of the 
market. This can be the result of bias or a response to superior information concerning the 
prospects of the firm or the CEO’s abilities. This paper finds that CEOs exhibiting both 
optimistic option-holding behaviors and superior prior industry-adjusted performance 
actually implement investment and financing decisions which are comparable to or better 
than those of non-optimistic CEOs, supporting the hypothesis that, for a significant 
proportion of CEOs, such behavior is most likely a rational response to temporary 
conditions rather than the unfortunate consequence of bias. 
Related literature that uses the observed option-holding policies of CEOs in order to 
identify optimistic CEOs are generally “interested in a “permanent” rather than a 
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“transitory” … effect” (Malmendier & Tate (2005a)). A CEO is typically classified as 
exhibiting an optimistic bias only if he displays qualifying behaviors at least twice and, if 
so, from the first such display until the end of the sample period. In Malmendier, Tate 
and Yan (2010), the effects of a bias to overestimate future cash-flows are discussed and 
treated in the same way as the effects of permanent impacts on a CEO’s personal history, 
such as growing up during the Great Depression or having a military background. In 
Campbell et al. (2011), optimism is treated as “semi-permanent” but only to the extent 
that a CEO’s optimism classification may change if the CEO exhibits the opposite bias 
later in the sample period. This paper finds that CEOs in the period 1992-2006 who 
would be classified as exhibiting a permanent bias using the Holder67 measure described 
in Malmendier & Tate (2005a) actually exhibit option-holding behaviors associated with 
this bias only infrequently, with 58% of such CEOs exhibiting such behavior less than 
67% of the time. Despite the high degree of annual variation in associated option-holding 
behaviors, the existing literature has focused exclusively on the effects of long term bias. 
This paper investigates the causes and consequences of short term variations in CEO 
optimism and demonstrates some important differences between the effects of short term 
optimism and more permanent optimism. 
Next, having established that CEO optimism does indeed vary over the short term, this 
paper investigates the factors which lead to annual changes in optimism and finds some 
support for the self-attribution hypothesis that CEOs attribute good performance to their 
own skills and poor performance to bad luck. CEO optimism increases more following 
good performance than it decreases following poor performance.  This is not the expected 
result if optimism were purely the mechanical consequence of equity returns. This paper 
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classifies CEOs exhibiting optimistic option-holding behavior according to the CEO’s 
most recent performance, where CEO performance is measured by the equity returns of 
the CEO’s firm relative to industry returns. CEOs whose option-holding behaviors 
identify them as optimists and whose optimism increases following superior CEO 
performance are classified as Justified Optimists. This nomenclature is chosen as, while a 
Justified Optimist’s option-holding behavior identifies him as optimistic, this paper 
hypotheses that his expectation that firm value will increase is the result of his private 
information rather than a bias.  Optimists whose optimism increases despite following 
inferior CEO performance are classified as Unjustified Optimists. This paper chooses to 
classify optimism as justified based on the CEO’s ex ante rationale for his increasing 
optimism rather than the ex post realized outcomes of his option-holding decisions as the 
paper is interested in those CEOs who had a common rational justification for their 
optimism rather than those whose optimism happened to be profitable. The remainder of 
the paper investigates whether the determinants of a CEO’s optimism impacts his 
investment and financing decisions. It is hypothesized that Justified Optimists are not 
actually subject to bias and consequently the investment and financing decisions of 
Justified Optimists should not be subject to the distortions identified in the existing 
literature. After all, sometimes an unbiased, rational CEO will correctly have a more 
positive view of the future than the market, or, in other words, it’s not optimism if you 
know you’re right. 
Heaton (2002) explains how managerial optimism can impact a firm’s investment policy. 
Overvaluing investment opportunities leads optimistic CEOs with available cash to 
overinvest relative to an unbiased CEO. However, overvaluing the firm causes an 
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optimistic CEO to be reluctant to raise external financing for investment. This paper finds 
that while the investment decisions of CEOs exhibiting optimistic behaviors are on 
average less sensitive to cash flow (in contrast to Malmendier & Tate (2005a)), the 
investment decisions of Justified Optimists are no more or less sensitive to cash flow than 
those of CEOs who are not displaying optimistic behaviors. 
Roll (1986) explains how management hubris can lead to value-destroying mergers. 
Billet & Qian (2008) claims an association between management hubris, acquisitiveness 
and negative post-acquisition performance. Malmendier & Tate (2008) and Kolasinski & 
Li (2013) find that a CEO’s tendency to overestimate future outcomes is associated with 
a higher propensity to complete mergers and a less favorable market reaction to those 
mergers as judged by announcement returns. This paper finds that optimistic CEOs are 
more likely to attempt a merger, but the announcement returns for Justified Optimists are 
actually higher than for the average CEO. This result suggests that the M&A performance 
of Justified Optimists is actually superior to that of CEOs who are not displaying 
optimistic behaviors. 
Deshmukh et al. (2013) predicts and finds that “firms led by overconfident CEOs pay 
lower dividends than firms led by rational CEOs” and that the “difference between the 
dividend payments by a rational CEO and an overconfident CEO is smaller in a firm with 
higher growth (Q).” It is argued that higher growth opportunities indicate less private 
information for overconfident CEOs to misinterpret and so the dividend decisions of 
overconfident CEOs and rational CEOs will be more similar. This paper finds that while 
optimistic CEOs are more likely to pay a lower dividend, the difference in dividend 
policy versus that of unbiased CEOs only narrows for Justified Optimists. This suggests 
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that unbiased CEOs make decisions similar to Justified Optimists in the absence of 
private information. The dividend policy of other types of optimistic CEOs do not 
become more like the dividend policy of rational CEOs as information about growth 
opportunities becomes widely available, suggesting that their dividend policy differences 
are indeed due to the effect of their bias rather than different information sets. 
Combining the evidence, it is reasonable to conclude that Justified Optimists are not so 
much overly optimistic as better informed or aware that they possess better skills for 
dealing with current uncertainties. The investment sensitivity of Justified Optimists is no 
different from that of unbiased CEOs which suggests Justified Optimists are not more 
likely to forego value-creating investment opportunities due to biased beliefs about the 
value of their firm. Justified Optimists do engage in more M&A activity but achieve 
better returns than CEOs who do not exhibit optimism. Lastly, unlike other optimistic 
CEOs, the dividend policies of Justified Optimists become more like those of unbiased 
CEOs as the informational advantage of CEOs versus their shareholders decreases. In 
short, there is a distinct group of optimistic CEOs whose decisions are either no different 
from or superior to those of CEOs who do not exhibit optimistic behaviors.  
This paper adds to the current literature on overconfidence and optimism. First, this paper 
demonstrates that many CEOs categorized as overconfident or optimistic actually exhibit 
the qualifying option-holding behavior relatively infrequently. Furthermore, by focusing 
on the determinants of annual variation in optimistic behaviors, rather than treating the 
bias as a permanent trait, it is possible to identify distinct groups of optimistic CEOs. 
Previously, CEOs who persistently displayed optimistic behaviors were shown to 
implement seemingly sub-optimal investment and financing decisions. Classifying 
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optimistic CEOs according to the determinants of their optimism allows the identification 
of a significant and distinct group of CEOs whose investment and financing decisions 
seem as good as or better than those of unbiased CEOs. While some groups’ behaviors 
may be characterized as “irrational” (or at least different from those of non-optimistic 
CEOs), those CEOs whose ITM is increasing as a result of the CEO’s own superior 
performance are not biased: their expectations of improved firm value is justified by their 
own prior performance and the appropriateness of their investment and financing 
decisions. 
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CHAPTER 2 
DATA 
This paper employs data from Compustat’s Execucomp database for information on CEO 
compensation including the number and estimated value of unexercised, exercisable 
options and the number and estimated realized value of exercised options. Therefore, the 
sample consists of S&P1500 firms from 1992 to 2012.  The data is supplemented with 
information on stock returns, index returns and market prices from the Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database. Data on a company’s annual balance sheet 
and income statement items comes from the Compustat Annual database. Data on 
industry returns is taken from French’s website 
(http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html), as are the 
definitions of the 49 different industries.  
The Thomson Securities Data Company (SDC) merger database is used to obtain 
information on the timing, incidence and proposed financing of takeover attempts to 
create a sample of 26,350 acquisitions, mergers and acquisitions of majority interest by 
publicly traded US firms announced over the period 1992-2013 where the acquirer held 
less than 50% of the target stock before the announcement but sought to own more than 
50% after the announcement. Variable definitions, other than those pertaining to CEO 
optimism, are given in the parts of the paper describing the experiments where they are 
used and in the respective tables. 
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VARIABLE CONSTRUCTION 
This paper closely follows Campbell et al. (2011)’s methodology for calculating 
estimated average ITM of a CEO’s unexercised, exercisable options and the estimated 
average realized ITM of exercised options using aggregated data from Execucomp. Of a 
sample of 35,413 CEO-year observations from Execucomp over the period 1992 to 2012, 
18,940 could be classified as “high-optimism”, “moderate-optimism” or “low-optimism” 
according to the methodology outlined in Campbell et al. (2011) based on the estimated 
average ITM of unexercised, exercisable options and the estimated average realized ITM 
of exercised options. When the estimated average ITM of a CEO’s unexercised, 
exercisable options in a given year is greater than or equal to 100%, this paper classifies 
the CEO as an Optimist. When a CEO’s option-holding policy in a given year would be 
classified as an indicator of low-optimism or moderate-optimism, this paper classifies the 
CEO as not an Optimist. Of the remaining CEO-year observations, 15,941 could not be 
classified as the combination of the ITM of unexercised, exercisable options and the 
realized value of exercised options did not allow a definitive classification and 68 could 
not be classified because of missing data. 
Column 1 of table 2, Panel A shows the distribution of CEO-year observations by year 
and their classification as Optimist or Not Optimist by year. There are 11,516 CEO-year 
observations where the CEO is not an Optimist, representing 4,098 unique CEO’s and 
2,651 unique firms. There are 7,424 CEO-year observations where the CEO exhibits 
optimistic behaviors, representing 2,722 unique CEOs and 2,206 unique firms. The last 
three columns of the table will be explained in Chapter 5. 
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MEASURING OPTIMISM 
There are two general approaches to measuring an individual’s optimism. Surveys of 
specific individuals potentially generate the most accurate measures of optimism but are 
expensive and time-consuming to collect, particularly for a large sample of individuals or 
over a long period of time: Ben-David, Graham & Campbell (2007) uses the results of a 
survey of CFO predictions; Graham, Campbell & Puri (2007) applies psychometric tests 
to test subjects. 
The alternative to surveys of limited samples of subjects is to identify optimistic 
behaviors using information from existing databases which cover a large sample of CEOs 
over a long period of time.  Researchers have successively innovated by applying related 
research and exploiting existing databases in order to develop measures of optimism 
based on existing, large databases. Hall & Murphy (2002) develops a theoretical 
threshold ITM of 67% at which a rational under-diversified CEO should exercise his 
stock options. Cicero (2009) confirms that executives do immediately sell their shares 
after exercising their options about 70% of the time, consistent with reducing their 
exposure to their own company. Malmendier & Tate (2005) applies this theoretical 
threshold to actual CEO option-holdings and classify CEOs who “persistently fail” to 
exercise options at or above the threshold as overconfident. Unfortunately, the 
information they use is not generally available and, as Kolasinski & Li (2013) puts it, 
“empirical research on CEO overconfidence is largely limited to a relatively small sample 
of less than 500 large firms that ends in 1994.”  Campbell et al. (2011) overcomes this 
limitation by developing a measure of average values of ITM using information available 
in Compustat’s Execucomp database. While a large sample of US firms is covered over a 
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reasonable period, the required option information is only available in Execucomp from 
1992. Kolasinski & Li (2013) proposes an even more readily calculable alternative, 
where a CEO is classified as being overconfident in a given year if the CEO “on average 
loses money from open-market purchases of his own company’s stock in the next 2 
years.” Confusingly, different authors use the same metric as a measure of both CEO 
“overconfidence” and CEO “optimism”. This paper is concerned with short term 
variation in a CEO’s evaluation of his firm’s prospects and follows Campbell et al. 
(2011) by referring to the metric as a measure of optimism, except when reviewing the 
existing literature where the cited authors’ own preferred description is used. 
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CHAPTER 3 
PERMANENCE OF OPTIMISM 
In order to demonstrate the relative infrequency of optimistic behavior amongst CEOs 
classified as exhibiting a permanent bias, this paper  estimates the average ITM of 
unexercised exercisable options of 1,416 CEOs of 530 large, publicly traded firms over 
the sample period 1992-2006 using Campbell et al.’s (2011) methodology. CEO’s are 
classified as “Holder67” if the ITM of their unexercised exercisable options is at least 
67% at least twice in the sample period. 
Table 1 shows the frequency of distribution of CEO-year observations in which ITM of 
unexercised exercisable options is at least 67%. The rows of the tables represent the 
number of annual observations where the ITM can be calculated. The columns represent 
the number of annual observations where ITM met or exceeded the 67% threshold. Panel 
A shows that 48.7% of CEOs never exhibited optimistic behavior and 13.8% exhibited it 
only once. Panel B shows the distribution of those CEOs which meet the Holder67 
classification for each year. 
It should be noticed that 57.7% of CEOs classified as Holder67 (or permanently biased) 
exhibited this behavior in two-thirds or fewer of the years in which the ITM could be 
calculated and 40.2% exhibited this behavior in half or fewer of the years in which the 
ITM could be calculated. Clearly, even those CEOs for whom a tendency to overestimate 
future outcomes has been identified as a “permanent” trait, the qualifying option-holding 
behavior is actually exhibited relatively rarely. 
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This paper seeks to understand what factors cause CEOs to exhibit optimistic behavior 
and whether the effects of CEO optimism on investment and financing decisions are 
different when CEO optimism has different causes. 
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CHAPTER 4 
DETERMINANTS OF CHANGE IN ANNUAL OPTIMISM 
It is widely accepted that humans are subject to a psychological bias called “self-
attribution” where individuals credit success to their own skills and failure to external 
factors or, as Langer & Roth (1975) succinctly puts it, “heads I win, tails it’s chance”. 
There are theoretical models linking self-attribution and overconfidence in investors 
(Daniel, Hirshleifer & Subrahmanyam (1998)) and traders (Gervais & Odean (2011)) and 
Hilary & Menzly (2006) offers empirical support for a link between confidence and self-
attribution for analysts. Using the sample of CEOs and the measure of optimism 
described in Chapter 2, this paper provides evidence of an association between CEO 
optimism and self-attribution. 
This paper first tests the self-attribution hypothesis by performing a logit regression to 
show how the probability of a CEO being classified as an optimist is affected by 
conditional returns. If the self-attribution hypothesis is correct then the probability that a 
CEO is optimistic increases more as a result of positive total equity returns than it 
decreases as a result of comparable negative equity returns. This can be tested using the 
following conditional logit regression: 
Conditional Logit Regression (1): 
Pr[Optimistic CEOt] = b1[returns│returns>0] + b2[returns│returns<0] + b3 [controls] 
where a CEO is Optimistic in year t if the ITM of a CEO’s unexercised, exercisable 
options is greater than or equal to 100% in year t. 
A conditional logit regression is performed rather than a regular logit regression to allow 
the use of fixed effects without introducing bias due to the incidental parameters problem, 
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Chamberlain (1980). Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticty across the error 
terms.  
The key variables of interest are the conditional returns. The self-attribution hypothesis 
predicts:  b1 > b2 >= 0. In other words, the probability that a CEO is optimistic increases 
more as a result of positive total equity returns than it decreases as a result of comparable 
negative equity returns. It is expected that b2 will be positive as negative returns are 
expected to reduce the probability that a CEO is optimistic. It should be expected that 
returns are associated with optimism as high returns lead to high equity prices and hence, 
ceteris paribus, high ITM of options. However unless the stock price is close to the 
exercise price of the unexercised option, a situation which is later controlled for, the 
impact of positive and negative returns on the ITM of the unexercised, exercisable 
options should be symmetrical. Equity returns are winsorized at 0.5% to avoid distortions 
from extreme values. 
Control variables include: change in total volatility versus (t-1); year x industry fixed 
effects (using Fama-French 49 classification); and age and gender CEO characteristics. 
Total volatility is calculated as the 60-month annualized volatility of the firm’s equity 
returns. Young is an indicator variable with a value of 1 if the CEO is 52 years old or 
younger in the year of observation (putting the CEO in the youngest tercile of CEOs in 
the sample) and 0 otherwise. Old is an indicator variable with a value of 1 if the CEO is 
59 years old or older in the year of observation (putting the CEO in the oldest tercile of 
CEOs in the sample) and 0 otherwise. Female is an indicator variable with a value of 1 if 
the CEO is female and 0 otherwise. Utility and finance firms (with SICs between 4900-
4999 and 6000-6699 respectively) are excluded from the sample as industry specific 
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regulation may influence the behaviors of their CEOs. The results of these analyses are 
robust to including these firms. 
Model 1 compares the impact of the positive total conditional equity returns and negative 
total conditional equity returns. Model 2 compares the impact of positive industry-
adjusted conditional equity returns and negative industry-adjusted conditional equity 
returns. Total equity returns are actually the result of CEO performance and general 
industry trends outside the CEO’s control; whereas industry-adjusted returns are more 
closely related to CEO performance relative to his industry peers. Models 1(b) and 2(b) 
exclude observations where the ITM of the CEO’s unexercised, exercisable options are 
less than 30%. The remaining CEOs would be classified as moderately or highly 
optimistic according to Campbell et al.’s (2011) thresholds. The price of the underlying 
stock should be sufficiently above than the exercise price of the underlying options to 
avoid distortions due to the non-linear payoffs of options close to their exercise price. To 
counter concerns that high values of the ITM of unexercised, exercisable options may 
identify inattentive CEOs rather than optimistic ones, models 1(c) and 2(c) also exclude 
years in which the CEO did not exercise any options. Holding some options despite 
having exercised others indicates a conscious decision not to exercise the remaining 
options.  
Table 2(a) “Self-attribution – differential impact of positive and negative returns on 
optimism” summarizes the results of the conditional logit regressions estimating the 
impact of various factors on the probability that a CEO is optimistic for an original 
sample of 15,054 CEO-year observations of all those CEO-year observations where the 
CEO optimism could be classified according to Campbell et al.’s methodology described 
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above. The table shows the absolute estimated coefficients for the variables and separate 
t-tests are performed to confirm whether the estimates of b1 and b2 are statistically 
different from one another. 
 
Table 2(a) provides some support for the self-attribution hypothesis. The estimated 
coefficients for conditional returns in each of the models are significantly different from 
zero and the point estimates of the coefficients for positive conditional returns are higher 
than those for negative conditional returns. However, t-tests show that the estimated 
coefficient for positive total conditional returns is statistically distinguishable from the 
estimated coefficient for negative total conditional returns only in models 1(b) and 1(c). 
Models 2(a), 2(b) and 2(c) in table 2(a) show that while the estimated coefficients for 
industry-adjusted conditional returns in each of the models are significantly different 
from zero and the point estimates of the coefficients for positive conditional returns are 
higher than those for negative conditional returns, the coefficients for positive industry-
adjusted conditional returns are not statistically different from the coefficients for 
negative industry-adjusted conditional returns. 
Interestingly, changes in the volatility of the stock price of the underlying stock do not 
have a statistically significant impact on a CEO’s optimism even though it will have an 
impact on the value of the CEO’s options. There is a non-linear relationship between 
CEO optimism and CEO age with both the youngest and the oldest tercile of CEOs being 
more likely to be optimistic. Table 2(a) also suggests that female CEOs are less likely 
than male CEOs to be Optimists.  
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The following robustness check tests how conditional returns directly impact the ITM of 
a CEO’s unexercised, exercisable options  through the following ordinary least squares 
regression. 
OLS Regression (2): 
ITM = b1[returns│returns>0] + b2[returns│returns<0] + b3 [controls] 
If the self-attribution hypothesis is correct then we would expect the following to be true: 
b1 > b2 >=0 (the ITM of unexercised, exercisable options should increase as a result of 
positive returns more than it decreases as a result of negative returns).  This is because 
increasing ITM of unexercised, exercisable options is associated with increasing 
optimism. It is expected that b2 will be greater than zero as negative returns should reduce 
the ITM of unexercised options. Table 2(b) “Self-attribution – differential impact of 
positive and negative returns on optimism” summarizes the results of OLS regressions 
estimating the impact of various factors on the change in ITM of a CEO’s unexercised, 
exercisable options for a sample of 15,054 CEO-year observations of all those CEO-year 
observations where the CEO optimism could be classified according to Campbell et al.’s 
methodology described above and where the firms were not utility or finance firms. 
Model 1 considers the differential impact of total conditional returns; model 2 considers 
the differential impact of positive industry-adjusted conditional returns and negative 
industry-adjusted conditional returns. As in table 2(a), models 1(b) and 2(b) exclude 
observations where the ITM of the CEO’s unexercised, exercisable options were less than 
30% and models 1(c) and 2(c) also exclude observations where the CEO did not exercise 
any options in order to exclude any observations where the CEO might not have made a 
deliberate decision to hold onto the unexercised exercisable options. In all models, ITM 
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and equity returns are winsorized at 0.5% to avoid distortions from extreme values. The 
OLS regressions use firm and year fixed effects, otherwise each model uses the same 
control variables as in table 2(a). Standard errors are clustered by firm and robust to 
heteroskedasticity and correlation in the residuals across observations for the same firm. 
The adjusted r-squared for all models is low (about 3-6%). This is to be expected as there 
are many other factors impacting the ITM of unexercised exercisable options including 
the availability of exercisable options and the decision the CEO’s decision whether to 
exercise any exercisable options. As predicted, the estimated coefficients for the positive 
conditional returns are highly significant and positive. The estimated coefficients for 
negative conditional returns are positive in all models and lower than those for positive 
conditional returns in all but model 2(c). This is consistent with the predictions of the 
self-attribution hypothesis: b1 > b2 >=0 however the t-tests show that the estimated 
coefficients for positive conditional returns are only statistically different from those for 
conditional negative returns for the industry-adjusted returns. Overall, the table suggests 
that ITM increases more when industry-adjusted returns are positive than it decreases 
when they are negative: consistent with the self-attribution hypothesis.  
 
ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS 
One alternative explanation of these results might be that the CEO was falsely classified 
as an Optimist due to a combination of the mechanistic impact of higher returns on the 
ITM of the CEO’s unexercised, exercisable options and CEO inertia (resulting in a failure 
to exercise his options through inaction rather than as a deliberate decision). This 
explanation is unlikely. 
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The mechanistic impact of returns on the ITM of unexercised, exercisable options would 
not generally explain the asymmetric impact of positive and negative returns: as long as 
the price of the stock underlying the option is not close to the exercise price of the option 
then an increase in the stock price will cause a comparable change in the ITM of an 
option to a comparable decrease in the stock price. It is true that when the stock price is 
close to the exercise price of the option the impact of positive and negative returns will 
not be symmetrical. However, the ITM of an unexercised, exercisable option is not purely 
a function of the price of the underlying stock: so long as an option has a positive ITM, 
the CEO can decide to exercise the option (in which case the option will not be included 
in the unexercised options) or hold the option. Secondly, to reduce concerns that the 
asymmetric impact of positive and negative returns is driven by options which were close 
to the money, models 1(b), 1(c), 2(b) and 2(c) in tables 2(a) and 2(b) exclude 
observations where the ITM was below 30%. The remaining observations are above 
Campbell et al.’s (2011) threshold for moderate optimism and are unlikely to have been 
close to the money options. Table 2(a) shows that the asymmetric impact of positive and 
negative returns on the probability of a CEO being an optimist actually becomes more 
pronounced when this adjustment is made.  
For CEOs to be misclassified as Optimists, they would also have to unintentionally hold 
the exercisable high ITM options. Such CEO inertia could occur if the CEOs were too 
busy to manager their personal wealth; however, over 54% of Optimists did exercise 
some options (this is only 6% lower than for non-Optimists), suggesting that these CEOs 
did make a conscious decision to hold onto their remaining exercisable options. Cicero 
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(2009) shows that executives are actually sophisticated and deliberate in their choice of 
option exercising strategies, choosing strategies which exploit differential tax rates and 
private information. Secondly, concerns about the inertia hypothesis are alleviated by 
excluding all CEO-year observations where the CEO did not exercise any options in 
models 1(c) and 2(c). Exercising some but not all options implies that holding the 
unexercised, exercisable options was a deliberate decision by the CEO. Table 2(a) shows 
that excluding potentially inert CEOs improves the explanatory power of the models 
while increasing the gap between the estimated coefficients b1 and b2. 
A second potential concern is that annual changes in the ITM of unexercised, exercisable 
options may be measuring annual changes in CEO risk tolerance rather than changes in 
CEO optimism. Hall & Murphy’s (2002) threshold ITM was calculated assuming the 
CEO had a Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) of 3. A CEO with a much higher 
risk tolerance will have a higher ITM threshold. If the ITM of unexercised exercisable 
options were actually measuring changes in annual risk tolerance rather than changes in 
optimism then the expected results of some tests in this paper would be different. It 
should not be expected that CEOs with high risk tolerance should prefer low payout 
ratios (as this paper finds) and it should not be expected that risk tolerance reacts 
asymmetrically to positive and negative total returns. It is therefore reasonable to accept 
that the observed option-holding behavior is a result of annual changes in the CEO’s 
optimism rather than risk tolerance. 
In summary, the combined results of the conditional logit and OLS regressions provide 
considerable, if not definitive, evidence to support the self-attribution hypothesis. 
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CHAPTER 5 
GROUPING OPTIMISTIC CEOS 
This paper shows that there is a significant and distinct group of optimistic CEOs whose 
apparently optimistic behavior is not necessarily the result of psychological bias and that 
this sub-group of CEOs makes investment and financing decisions which are no different 
from or superior to those of unbiased, non-optimistic CEOs. 
Malmendier & Tate (2005a) divides its Holder67 CEOs into ‘Hold and Win 67’ and 
‘Hold and Lose 67’, according to the outcome of their decision to hold exercisable 
options with an ITM of greater than 67% turned out ex post, in order to test whether 
investment distortions may be due to superior private information. They find no 
difference between the two groups. Kolasinski and Li (2013) defines CEOs as justifiably 
confident CEOs, according to the ex post 180-day returns from buying their own 
company stock and finds that the merger announcement returns of the justifiably 
confident CEOs are no different from those of CEOs who are not confident. 
While claiming that optimism is justifiable based on ex post realized returns might be 
intuitively appealing, optimism is defined as a tendency to overestimate the value of 
uncertain future outcomes, it ignores the rationale for a CEO’s expectation. A manager 
who believes his firm is undervalued without any reasonable justification will be right in 
a rising market; whereas a rational CEO without bias will not always realize positive 
outcomes even when the positive outcome could be rationally justified. In other words, 
the rationale for a decision is a better indication of the absence of bias than the ex post 
results of that decision. 
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This paper distinguishes between justified and unjustified optimism based on the 
rationale for the optimism. Chapter 4 of this paper provides support for the claim that 
CEO optimism is subject to self-attribution (it increases more when CEO performance is 
positive than it decreases when CEO performance is negative) and so it is reasonable to 
separate optimistic CEOs into justifiable optimists and unjustifiable optimists according 
to the CEO’s recent performance rather than the ex post accuracy of their expectations. 
The results of this methodology suggest that this approach may be superior to the 
alternative of determining justifiability based on outcomes. Kolasinski and Li (2013) 
highlights that, according to its methodology, the merger announcement returns for 
justifiably confident CEOs are negative; whereas Chapter 7 of this paper shows that its 
methodology yields positive merger announcement returns for justified optimists. 
To identify “Justified Optimists”, this paper selects optimistic CEOs whose optimism 
increased following positive industry-adjusted equity returns.  To identify “Unjustified 
Optimists”, optimistic CEOs whose optimism increases despite following negative 
industry-adjusted equity returns are selected. The rationale for this classification is that 
increases in optimism due to positive industry-adjusted returns are likely to be due to the 
demonstrated superior skill or judgment of the CEO; whereas increases in optimism 
despite negative industry-adjusted returns are more likely to be due to the CEO’s bias. 
The classification is performed using increasing ITM of unexercised, exercisable options 
as a measure of increasing optimism. 
Table 3, panel A summarizes the annual frequency of Justified Optimists and Unjustified 
Optimists. There are 3,079 CEO-year observations where the CEO is classified as a 
Justified Optimist (16.3% of the total CEO-year observations and 41.5% of the 
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observations classified as Optimistic). There are 1,269 CEO-year observations where the 
CEO is classified as an Unjustified Optimist (6.7% of the total CEO-year observations 
and 17.1% of the observations classified as Optimistic). 
Table 3, Panel B summarizes the characteristics of the different groups of CEOs. The 
differences in the ITM of unexercised, exercisable options and returns reflect the 
definitions of the various groups. There seems to be no significant difference in the mean 
ages of the different groups of CEOs and, due to the low percentage of female CEOs, the 
differences in the gender ratio of the various groups is also low.  
The CFO Optimist indicator is shown as a simple robustness test for the Justified 
Optimist indicator. If the optimism of Justified Optimists is indeed justified, it would be 
expected that the CFOs working for Justified Optimists should be more likely to exhibit 
optimism than the CFOs of Unjustified Optimists. Firstly, CFOs are likely to be astute 
concerning the financial prospects of the firm and optimal option-holding behavior. 
Secondly, the CFO is less likely than the CEO to be subject to a biased evaluation of the 
CEO’s abilities. Lastly, Wang, Shin & Francis (2012) shows that CFOs tend to earn 
higher returns than CEOs when trading the stock of their own company and concludes 
that CFO trades have more informational content than those of CEOs. 
The CFO Optimist indicator is equal to 1 when the CFO exhibits optimistic option-
holding behavior and is set to 0 otherwise. Table 3, Panel B shows that Justified 
Optimists have the highest mean value for CFO Optimist indicator (indicating that 73.8% 
of Justified Optimists’ CFOs are also optimistic, compared to 26.3% for CFOs of the 
average CEO and 66.4% of CFOs of the average Optimist). Separate t-tests show the 
differences in means between Justified Optimists and all other CEOs (54.7%) and 
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between Justified Optimists and all other Optimist CEOs (12.6%) are both statistically 
significant with p-values less than 1%. If it is accepted that CFOs are less likely to be 
biased and are more likely to be financially astute, then the higher coincidence of CFO 
optimism and CEO optimism for Justified Optimists is an indication that Justified 
Optimists are indeed justified in their optimism. 
While this is reassuring, the key test of whether the behavior of Justified Optimists is 
indeed not the result of a psychological bias is whether Justified Optimists as a group 
implement financing and investment decisions different from those of CEOs who do not 
exhibit optimistic option-holding behavior. 
  















1992 214 149 65 x x 65
1993 659 401 258 71 67 120
1994 797 503 294 116 35 143
1995 903 547 356 164 96 96
1996 977 537 440 210 75 155
1997 1,096 516 580 304 105 171
1998 1,027 503 524 244 50 230
1999 988 473 515 195 96 224
2000 1,018 502 516 242 64 210
2001 935 581 354 105 55 194
2002 791 573 218 57 15 146
2003 1,056 686 370 98 150 122
2004 1,139 710 429 214 89 126
2005 1,073 649 424 200 62 162
2006 1,166 668 498 163 84 251
2007 1,121 648 473 214 21 238
2008 695 512 183 46 7 130
2009 735 535 200 63 64 73
2010 897 642 255 129 62 64
2011 811 577 234 125 23 86
2012 842 604 238 119 49 70
Total 18,940 11,516 7,424 3,079 1,269 3,076
Sample includes CEOs of S&P1500 firms whose optimism can be calculated 
according to the methodology described in Campbell et al. (2011). CEO classified as 
Optimist if ITM of unexercised exercisable options >=100% in given year. Justified 
Optimist is an Optimist where the ITM-ness of unexercised exercisable options has 
increased versus the prior year and industry-adjusted returns are positive. Unjustified 
Optimist is an Optimist where the ITM-ness of unexercised exercisable options has 
increased vs prior year and industry-adjusted returns are negative.




N Mean Median Std Dev Min Max
All CEOs
Optimist indicator 18,940 0.392 0.000 0.488 0.000 1.000
Justified Optimist indicator 18,940 0.163 0.000 0.369 0.000 1.000
Unjustified Optimist indicator 18,940 0.067 0.000 0.250 0.000 1.000
CFO Optimist indicator 5,163 0.263 0.000 0.440 0.000 1.000
ITM-ness of unexercised, exercisable options 18,940 1.739 0.773 5.053 0.000 61.372
Total returns (%) 17,562 28.2% 17.9% 72.4% -97.8% 2809.5%
Industry-adjusted returns (%) 17,562 9.7% 3.0% 66.5% -313.1% 2654.2%
CEO age 18,266 55.4 55.0 7.2 29.0 91.0
CEO female indicator 18,940 0.016 0.000 0.124 0.000 1.000
All Optimists
Justified Optimist indicator 7,424 0.415 0.000 0.493 0.000 1.000
Unjustified Optimist indicator 7,424 0.171 0.000 0.376 0.000 1.000
CFO Optimist indicator 1,649 0.664 1.000 0.472 0.000 1.000
ITM-ness of unexercised, exercisable options 7,424 3.688 1.875 7.667 1.000 61.372
Total returns (%) 6,843 45.7% 31.7% 83.0% -97.8% 1772.6%
Industry-adjusted returns (%) 6,843 24.6% 13.4% 76.6% -313.1% 1739.0%
CEO age 7,218 54.9 55.0 7.5 32.0 90.0
CEO female indicator 7,424 0.012 0.000 0.110 0.000 1.000
Justified Optimists
CFO Optimist indicator 679 0.738 1.000 0.440 0.000 1.000
ITM-ness of unexercised, exercisable options 3,079 3.943 2.026 7.760 1.000 61.372
Total returns (%) 3,079 76.1% 52.6% 95.2% -54.8% 1772.6%
Industry-adjusted returns (%) 3,079 57.1% 35.2% 84.5% 0.0% 1739.0%
CEO age 3,028 55.0 55.0 7.4 33.0 80.0
CEO female indicator 3,079 0.012 0.000 0.109 0.000 1.000
Unjustified Optimists
CFO Optimist indicator 234 0.543 1.000 0.499 0.000 1.000
ITM-ness of unexercised, exercisable options 1,269 3.467 1.752 7.800 1.000 61.372
Total returns (%) 980 21.9% 20.2% 34.2% -87.5% 142.4%
Industry-adjusted returns (%) 980 -24.1% -15.4% 26.0% -313.1% 0.0%
CEO age 1,237 55.5 55.0 7.6 34.0 83.0
CEO female indicator 1,269 0.008 0.000 0.088 0.000 1.000
Other Optimists
CFO Optimist indicator 736 0.635 1.000 0.482 0.000 1.000
ITM-ness of unexercised, exercisable options 3,076 3.524 1.808 7.512 1.001 61.372
Total returns (%) 2,784 20.4% 6.6% 68.1% -97.8% 828.5%
Industry-adjusted returns (%) 2,784 5.7% -0.9% 62.7% -215.4% 747.2%
CEO age 2,953 54.5 54.0 7.6 32.0 90.0
CEO female indicator 3,076 0.014 0.000 0.119 0.000 1.000
CEO classified as Optimist if ITM of unexercised exercisable options >=100% in given year. Justified Optimist is 
an Optimist where the ITM-ness of unexercised exercisable options has increased versus the prior year and 
industry-adjusted returns are positive. Unjustified Optimist is an Optimist where the ITM-ness of unexercised 
exercisable options has increased vs prior year and industry-adjusted returns are negative.
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CHAPTER 6 
 
OPTIMISM AND INVESTMENT SENSITIVITY TO CASH FLOW 
Heaton (2002) presents a simple model to describe the interaction between managerial 
optimism, investment and free cash flow. An optimistic manager overvalues his firm’s 
investment opportunities causing him to want to overinvest but he also overestimates the 
value of his firm and therefore sees external financing as costly. An optimistic CEO will 
therefore invest more than an unbiased CEO when the firm’s cash flow is sufficiently 
high but will reduce investment more than an unbiased CEO when the firm’s cash flow is 
low.  
This paper hypothesizes that while Justified Optimists may be more likely to invest than 
other unbiased CEOs, the investment sensitivity to cash flow of Justified Optimists 
should be no different from that of unbiased CEOs. Justified Optimists, if unbiased, will 
not forfeit good investment opportunities due to a lack of internal funds. This hypothesis 
is tested by regressing investment against the interaction term between the optimism 
indicator variable and normalized cash flow, along with standard controls for explaining 
corporate investment. Malmendier & Tate (2005a) interpret a statistically significant 
estimated beta for this interaction term as an indication of investment sensitivity to cash 
flow. Although investment cannot be less than zero, the distribution of investment across 
firms shows no distortions and so a truncated Tobit regression is not necessary to avoid 
any potential bias of an OLS regression.   
OLS (3): 
Investment = b1[cash flow] + b2[Q] + b3[optimism] + b4[optimism*cash flow] + 
b5[controls] 
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where investment is defined as firm capital expenditures normalized by capital at the 
beginning of the year; cash flow is calculated as operating income before depreciation 
minus interest, tax and dividend payments and is normalized by capital at the beginning 
of the observation year; Q is calculated as the market value of assets divided by the book 
value of assets; optimism is represented by indicator variables for CEO optimism; and 
controls include standard variables for investment regressions such as CEO stock 
ownership and aggregate vested options, firm size, year fixed effects and firm fixed 
effects. Firm size is measured as the natural log of total assets. Standard errors are 
clustered by firm. Outlier values of normalized cash flow and investment are removed by 
trimming observations with the highest and lowest 1% of values. There are 4,299 CEO-
year observations with usable data, of which 15.9% are Justified Optimists, 7.6% are 
Unjustified Optimists and 15.6% are Optimists (excluding Justified and Unjustified 
Optimists). 
The key variables of interest are the interactions between the optimism indicator variables 
and cash flow. These interaction variables are calculated as the product of cash flow and 
the respective optimism indicator variables. If the hypothesis is correct and the 
investment decisions of Justified Optimists are no more sensitive to cash flow than those 
of non-optimistic CEOs then the estimated beta for the interaction between the Justified 
Optimism indicator and cash flow (b4) should not be significantly different from zero. 
Table 4 summarizes the results of the analysis. 
It should be expected that optimistic CEOs will invest more than non-optimistic CEOs as 
they are likely to overestimate the returns of investment projects, in which case the 
estimated betas for the optimism indicator variables should be positive and statistically 
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significant. Table 4, which summarizes the OLS regressions, shows that while the 
estimated betas are positive and statistically significant for all optimists in model 1 and 
all types of optimists in model 2, they are not statistically significant for Justified 
Optimists in model 3. A t-test comparing the estimated betas for the Optimist (excl. 
Justified & Unjustified Optimists) indicator variable and the Justified Optimist indicator 
variable shows they are not equal, with a statistical significance of 1%.  Together this 
suggests that Optimists (excluding Justified and Unjustified Optimists) invest more than 
non-optimist CEOs and that Justified Optimists invest no less and may invest more than 
non-optimist CEOs.  
Most importantly, although the investment sensitivity to cash flow is negative for 
Optimists as a group (see model 1), as predicted, the investment sensitivity to cash flow 
of Justified Optimists is not statistically different from that of rational CEOs (see models 
2 and 3). A t-test shows the estimated betas for the interaction terms of the Optimist 
(excl. Justified & Unjustified)*Cash Flow and Justified Optimist*Cash Flow are also not 
equal to one another (with a statistical significance level of 1%). This suggests that any 
overinvestment by Justified Optimists relative to non-optimistic CEOs is independent of 
the availability of internal funds. It may be that a Justified Optimist is better able to 
convince external financiers of the reasonableness of his evaluation of the project’s 
return. It may be that a Justified Optimist simply prefers to share some of the project’s 
gains with external investors rather than forfeit all the gains of a positive NPV project.  
As hypothesized, Justified Optimists are a distinct group from other optimistic CEOs: 
they do not overinvest as much as other optimists and, most importantly, their investment 
is no more sensitive to cash flow than that of non-optimistic CEOs.  
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Interestingly, and contrary to Malmendier & Tate (2005a), the investment sensitivity to 
cash flow of Optimists (excluding Justified and Unjustified Optimists) is actually 
negative, implying that as cash flow increases the investment decisions become more like 
those of non-optimistic CEOs. This would be a perverse result if it is interpreted as 
meaning that Optimistic CEOs invest less as cash flow increases. A more intuitive 
interpretation is consistent with Jensen’s (1986) agency costs of cash flow theory: 
optimistic CEOs overinvest due to higher expected returns, but non-optimistic CEOs 
overinvest due to higher availability of internal funds. Thus, as cash flows increase, non-
optimistic CEOs will invest more thereby reducing the difference in investment between 
non-optimistic and optimistic CEOs. 
In summary, while the investment decisions of Optimists (excluding Justified and 
Unjustified Optimists) are distinct from non-optimistic CEOs, this analysis finds no 
evidence to suggest that the investment decisions of Justified Optimists are any more 
sensitive to changes in cash flow than the investment decisions of non-optimistic CEOs 
and provides only limited evidence that their investment decisions are any different from 
non-optimistic CEOs. 
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Table 4 
CEO Optimism and Corporate Investment 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Observations used 4,288 4,288 4,288
R-squared (adj) 0.160 0.165 0.170
Optimism Indicator Variables
Optimist 0.018*** x x
Justified Optimist x 0.009* 0.007
Unjustified Optimist x 0.012* 0.011*
Optimist (excl. Justified & Unjustified) x 0.031*** 0.029***
Optimist * CF -0.021** x x
Justified Optimist*CF x -0.004 0.001
Unjustified Optimist*CF x -0.020 -0.019
Optimist (excl. Justified & Unjustified) *CF x -0.037*** -0.034***
Explanatory Variables
Cash Flow 0.063*** 0.064*** 0.128***
Q 0.006*** 0.059** 0.008***
Controls
Stock Ownership 0.001** 0.001** 0.001
Vested Options -0.241 -0.202 -0.270
Firm size (log of total assets) 0.009* 0.009* 0.013**
Interactive Terms
Q*Cash Flow x x -0.004*
Stock Ownership * Cash Flow x x 0.001
Vested Options * Cash Flow x x 0.264
Size * Cash Flow x x -0.009*
Fixed effects
Year Y Y Y
Firm Y Y Y
Sample of 18,940 CEO-year observations over the period 1992-2012. Dependent variable is Investment
defined as firm capital expenditures normalized by capital at the beginning of the year. Optimist is an
indicator variable with a value of 1 if the CEO is an optimist according to the classification described part
II. Justified Optimist is an indicator variable with a value of 1 if CEO is classified as Justified Optimist
due to increasing ITM-ness of unexercised, exerciseable options, as defined in part V. Unjustified 
Optimist is an indicator variable with a value of 1 if CEO is classified as Unjustified Optimist due to
increasing ITM-ness of unexercised, exercisable options as defined in chapter 5. Optimist (excluding
Justified/Unjustified) is an indicator variable with a value of 1 if the CEO is an Optimist but is not a
Justified Optimist or Unjustified Optimist . Cash flow is cash flow normalised by capital at the beginning
of the year, calculated as [(oibdp - xint -txt - dvc)/ppegt]. Q is the market value of assets over the book
value of assets. Stock Ownership is the percentage of company stock held by the CEO. Vested Options is 
aggregate number of unexercised options held by the executive at fiscal year end that were vested as a
percentage of total shares outstanding. Firm size is log of assets. All models include firm and year fixed
effects. The table shows the estimated co-efficient for each explanatory variable. Standard errors are
clustered by firm. The superscripts ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%
levels, respectively.
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CHAPTER 7 
OPTIMISM AND M&A ACTIVITY 
Existing literature finds an association between a CEO exhibiting an optimistic bias and 
his propensity to engage in mergers and acquisitions (M&A) and that the market reacts 
less favorably to announcements of acquisitions by CEOs exhibiting such a bias.  It is 
hypothesized that Justified Optimists are not biased and are therefore less likely to 
engage in irrational value-destroying M&A activity. This paper finds that while there is 
evidence that Justified Optimists are more likely to attempt a takeover, the announcement 
of such an attempt is associated with positive abnormal returns, even after controlling for 
the means of financing the deal. Given Justified Optimists’ option-holding decisions are 
based on positive prior industry-adjusted performance and their M&A decisions are 
positively received by the stock market, the M&A decisions of Justified Optimists should 
not be described as the result of a bias. 
Table 5 “Probability of takeover attempt” shows the results of conditional logit 
regressions of how various factors impact the probability of a CEO engaging in a 
takeover attempt within one year and within the next three years. A CEO is classified as 
engaging in a takeover attempt if he is chief executive of a publicly traded US firm 
(excluding utility and finance firms) which announces an attempt to acquire, merge with 
or acquire a majority interest in a target firm where the acquirer holds less than 50% of 
the target stock before the announcement but seeks to own more than 50% after the 
announcement. The sample period for the conditional logit regression of the probability 
of a takeover attempt within three years is necessarily shorter by two years. In column 1, 
the dependent variable takes the value of 1 if the CEO engages in a takeover attempt 
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within one year and otherwise takes a value of 0. In column 2, the dependent variable 
takes a value of 1 if the CEO engages in a takeover attempt within three years and 
otherwise takes a value of 0. The unit of observation is the CEO-year. The primary 
variables of interests are the indicator variables indicating that the CEO was a Justified 
Optimist, an Unjustified Optimist or an Optimist (excluding Justified and Unjustified 
Optimist) in a given year. Positive estimated coefficients for these indicator variables 
would indicate that these CEO types are more likely to engage in M&A activity, negative 
estimated coefficients would indicate a lower propensity to engage in M&A activity. 
The conditional logit regression includes controls for firm characteristics which might 
impact the CEO’s likelihood of engaging in M&A activity: firm size, cash availability 
and the firm’s market-to-book ratio. Industry and year fixed effects control for the 
potential influence of merger waves and any industry specific tendency to engage in (or 
avoid) mergers.  
The economic characteristics of the CEO’s firms have the expected impacts on the 
probability of a takeover attempt: large, cash-rich firms are more likely to engage in a 
takeover attempt. The signs of the estimated coefficients for CEO age indicator variables 
suggest that young CEOs are more likely to engage in a takeover attempt and old CEOs 
are less likely to engage in a takeover attempt. 
As expected, optimistic CEOs are generally more likely to engage in a takeover attempt. 
The estimated coefficients of the Optimist (excluding Justified and Unjustified Optimists) 
and Justified Optimist indicator variables are positive and statistically significant; the 
estimated coefficient for the Unjustified Optimist indicator variable is not. The estimated 
coefficient of the Justified Optimist indicator variable is always the highest. Separate t-
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tests show that the estimated coefficient of the Justified Optimist indicator is different 
from those of the Unjustified Optimist and the other Optimist (excluding Justified and 
Unjustified Optimists) indicators for the one year period, suggesting that Justified 
Optimists are the most likely to engage in takeover attempts.  
Table 6 “Cumulative Abnormal Returns and Optimism” provides evidence on the impact 
of CEO optimism and announcement returns relating to takeover attempts. It shows the 
estimated betas of an OLS regression of cumulative abnormal announcement returns 
(CARs) for takeover attempts with CEO optimism as explanatory variables and controls 
for deal characteristics, acquiring firm characteristics, as well as year and Fama-French 
49 industry fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by firm. 
Columns 1 and 2 show estimates for value-weighted announcement returns for the three 
day window from the day before the announcement of a takeover attempt to the day after 
the announcement (-1,+1). Columns 3 and 4 show estimates for value-weighted 
announcement returns for the seven day window from 3 days before the announcement of 
a takeover attempt to 3 days after the announcement (-3,+3).  The seven day window 
captures the impact from any rumors or insider-trading before the announcement and any 
slow to react investors after the announcement; the shorter three day window misses such 
impacts but also excludes the impact of any unrelated information released over the 
longer period. 
Columns 1 and 3 do not control for how the takeover attempt was to be financed. 
Columns 2 and 4 use indicator variables to control for the method of financing the deal. 
Cash(>50%) is an indicator variable with a value of 1 if, according to Thomson SDC, the 
deal was to be mostly financed with cash and otherwise has a value of 0. Stock (>50%) is 
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an indicator variable with a value of 1 if, according to Thomson SDC, the deal was to be 
mostly financed with stock and otherwise has a value of 0. Hostile is an indicator variable 
with a value of 1 if, according to Thomson SDC, the takeover attempt was categorized as 
hostile and otherwise has a value of 0. There are 2,617 announcement events which can 
be matched with the CEO sample and have calculable CAR’s, of which 22.2% are 
Justified Optimists, 8.1% are Unjustified Optimists and 20.9% are Optimists (excluding 
Justified and Unjustified Optimists). 
The following results are of interest. Firstly, the announcement returns for takeover 
attempts by CEOs who are Justified Optimists are significantly higher than for those by 
the average CEO. This is true for both windows and is also true when controls for 
financing are included. This is consistent with the hypothesis that Justified Optimists are 
rational and do not engage in value-destroying takeovers. Secondly, the estimated betas 
for other optimists are positive but only the estimated beta for the Optimists (excluding 
Justified and Unjustified Optimists) is statistically significant and only for the returns 
over the 3-day window. This further supports the hypothesis that Justified Optimists are a 
group distinct from the other CEOs classified as optimists. 
Overall, these results support the hypothesis that Justified Optimists do not engage in 
value-destroying M&A activity. Rather they are more likely to attempt a takeover but the 
market judges merger attempts by Justified Optimists more favorably than attempts by 
other CEOs. Thus, it appears that the underlying cause of what has been perceived in 
prior literature as optimism matters crucially. 
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Table 5 
Probability of Takeover Attempt 
Conditional logit regressions of factors affecting probability of a CEO attempting a takeover
Pr (within 1 year) Pr(within 1-3 years)
Observations used 11,718 12,426 
Pseudo R-squared 0.042 0.044
Optimism indicator variables
Justified Optimist 0.373*** 0.276***
Unjustified Optimist 0.080 0.080
Optimist (excl. Justified & Unjustified) 0.164** 0.210***
Firm's economic characteristics
Firm size (log of total assets) 0.315*** 0.324***
Cash as % total assets 1.028*** 1.224***
Market to Book 0.050*** 0.058***
CEO characteristics
Young (<52 years old) 0.117** 0.113**
Old (>59 years old) -0.152** -0.168***
Female -0.184 -0.063\
Fixed effects
Years x Industry (FF49) Y Y
Sample period 1992-2012 1992-2010
t-test: Justified=Optimist N** x
t-test: Justified=Unjustified N*** N**
Sample of 15,054 CEO-year observations (excluding finance and utility firms) over the period 1992-
2012. Incidence of takeover attempts from Thomson SDC database. Dependent variable in logit
regressions is probability of a takeover attempt within 1 year of the observation and probability of a
takeover attempt within 3 years of observation. Justified Optimist is an indicator variable with a value
of 1 if CEO is classified as Justified Optimist due to increasing ITM-ness of unexercised, exerciseable
options, as defined in part V. Unjustified Optimist is an indicator variable with a value of 1 if CEO is
classified as Unjustified Optimist due to increasing ITM-ness of unexercised, exercisable options as
defined in part V. Optimist (excluding Justified/Unjustified) is an indicator variable with a value of 1
if the CEO is an Optimist but is not a Justified Optimist or Unjustified Optimist . Firm size is log of
assets. Cash as % of total assets is [che/at]. MTB is [((at-ceq)+(csho*prcc_f))/at]. Young is an
indicator variable with value 1 if the CEO is 52 or younger in the year of the observation and 0
otherwise. Old is an indicator variable with a value of 1 if the CEO is 59 or older in the year of the
observation and 0 otherwise. Female is an indicator variable with a value of 1 if the CEO is female
and 0 otherwise. All models include industry x year fixed effects. The table shows the estimated co-
efficient for each explanatory variable with robust standard errors. The superscripts ***, ** and *
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 6 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns and Optimism 
OLS Regressions of CARs over takeover attempt announcement windows.
Observations used 2,617 2,617 2,617 2,617
R-squared (adj) 0.024 0.030 0.024 0.025
Optimism indicator variables
Justified Optimist 0.007* 0.007* 0.014*** 0.014***
Unjustified Optimist 0.001 0.001 0.008 0.008
Optimist (excl. Justified & Unjustified) 0.008 0.008* 0.007 0.007
Deal characteristics
Cash (>50%) x 0.006** x 0.004
Stock (>50%) x -0.010*** x -0.009*
Hostile x -0.007 x -0.008
Acquiring firm characteristics
Cash as % assets -0.011 -0.007 -0.002 0.001
Market-to-Book 0.003** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003***
Firm size (log of total assets) -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003***
Book leverage 0.014 0.011 0.019 0.016
Cash Flow as % assets -0.107** -0.111** -0.122** -0.125**
Fixed effects
Years Y Y Y Y
Industry (FF49) Y Y Y Y
Sample of 2,617 announcements which met criteria described in part VI and could be matched to CEOs in main
sample. Deal characteristics from Thomson SDC. Dependent variable in (-1,+1) column is value-weighted
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) from 1 day before announcement of takeover until 1 day after the
announcement. Dependent variable in (-3,+3) column is value-weighted Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs)
from 3 days before announcement of takeover until 3 days after the announcement. Justified Optimist is an
indicator variable with a value of 1 if CEO is classified as Justified Optimist due to increasing ITM-ness of
unexercised, exerciseable options, as defined in part V. Unjustified Optimist is an indicator variable with a value 
of 1 if CEO is classified as Unjustified Optimist due to increasing ITM-ness of unexercised, exercisable options
as defined in part V. Optimist (excluding Justified/Unjustified) is an indicator variable with a value of 1 if the
CEO is an Optimist but is not a Justified Optimist or Unjustified Optimist . Cash (>50%) is an indicator
variable with a value of 1 if the takeover attempt is to be financed mostly with cash. Stock (>50%) is an
indicator variable with a value of 1 if the takeover attempt is to be finance most with equity. Hostile is an
indicator variable with a value of 1 if the takeover attempt is reported as hostile on Thomson SDC. MTB is [((at-
ceq)+(csho*prcc_f))/at]. Firm size is log of assets. Book leverage is [(dltt+dlc)/at]. Cash Flow as % assets is [
(oibdp-xint-txt-dvc)/at]. All models include year fixed effects and Fama-French 49 industry fixed effects. The
table shows the co-efficient for each explanatory variable with standard errors clustered by firm. The
superscripts ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
(-1,+1) (-3,+3)
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CHAPTER 8 
OPTIMISM AND PAYOUT POLICY 
 
OPTIMISM AND DIVIDEND PAYOUT 
Deshmukh et al. (2013) models the interaction between CEO overconfidence and 
dividend policy, where overconfidence is defined as “an upward bias in expectations of 
future outcomes (overoptimism)”, and predicts that biased CEOs will pay lower levels of 
dividends than unbiased CEOs and the “reduction in dividends associated with CEO 
overconfidence is greater in firms with lower growth opportunities”. The paper’s 
empirical results confirm the predictions of the model. The results of the random-effects 
Tobit model of dividend payout show a negative estimated beta for optimists and a 
positive estimated beta for the interaction between optimists and growth firms. 
The rationale given for the lower overall dividend payout is that biased CEOs believe 
external funds to be expensive and so cash is conserved to maintain financial slack. The 
explanation for the interaction between growth opportunities and overconfidence is more 
complex. Deshmukh et al. (2013) highlights that a CEO’s beliefs about the value of 
investment projects may be “based on private information … or on widely available 
public information. CEO overconfidence has a greater impact in the former case than in 
the latter.” Where information is widely available, both overconfident and rational CEOs 
will choose to invest in these growth opportunities, making the CEO’s personal bias less 
important in determining the cash needs and hence the dividend policy of the firm. Where 
information is private, the impact of the managers belief’s on his evaluation of the 
investment opportunities will be larger.  
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If Justified Optimists are not biased then it would be expected that they would pay out 
lower dividends when they had private information about growth opportunities which 
were not recognized by the market but would pay similar dividends to unbiased CEOs if 
all the growth opportunities were fully reflected in the market price. It should therefore 
be expected that the estimated beta of a Justified Optimist indicator variable should be 
negative and the estimated beta of the interaction between the Justified Optimist indicator 
variable and growth opportunities should be positive. 
If optimistic CEOs (excluding Justified Optimists) are not rational then it would be 
expected that they would pay out lower dividends regardless of whether the firm’s 
growth opportunities are fully reflected in its market price: the overvaluation of their 
firms’ investment opportunities is based on their bias and not on private information. 
Therefore,  it should be expected that the estimated beta for Optimists (excluding 
Justified and Unjustified Optimists) should be negative but the estimated beta for the 
interaction between the respective optimism indicator variable and growth opportunities 
should be zero (or at least lower than for the interaction between the Justified Optimist 
indicator variable and growth opportunities). The perceived need for cash for investment 
of a biased CEO is due to his bias and not due to private information not yet reflected in 
the market valuation of the firm. 
These hypotheses will be tested by regressing dividend payout against the CEO optimism 
measures and standard controls for dividend policy similar to table 4 of Deshmukh et al. 
(2013). As the distribution of dividend payouts across the sample is distorted because 
dividend payout is truncated at zero, a Tobit regression is appropriate in order to avoid 
the potential bias of an OLS regression.  
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Random Effects Tobit Regression (4): 
Dividend Payout = b1[optimism] + b2[optimism*growth opportunities] + b3[controls] 
where dividend payout is defined as the ratio between dividends to market value of 
equity; optimism is represented by indicator variables for CEO optimism; and controls 
include standard variables for dividend regressions such as cash flow, CEO stock 
ownership (%), CEO vested options, firm size, year fixed effects and industry fixed 
effects (Fama-French 49). Following Deshmukh et al (2013), growth opportunities are 
measured by the ratio of market value to book value of assets; cash flow is defined as 
operating income before depreciation normalized by total assets; firm size is measured as 
the natural log of sales; and outlier values of cash flow and investment were removed by 
trimming the observations with the highest and lowest 1% of values. All models control 
for firm-level random effects. The sample excludes utility and finance firms as their 
payout policies are influenced by regulation. There are 8,682 CEO-year observations 
with sufficient non-missing data to be included in the analysis, of which 17.0% are 
Justified Optimists, 7.2% are Unjustified Optimists and 18.5% are Optimists (excluding 
Justified and Unjustified Optimists). 
A random effects model is used to match the approach of Deshmukh et al (2013) and to 
limit the drawbacks of fixed effects models, namely: the significant loss of degrees of 
freedom due to the implicit use of indicator variables; and the loss of time-invariant 
explanatory variables. 
Table 7 shows the results of the analysis. Model 1 does not breakdown the different 
groups of optimists and the results match the predictions of Deshmukh et al (2013): the 
estimated beta for the Optimism indicator is negative, the estimated beta for the 
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interaction between Optimism and growth opportunities is positive and both estimates are 
statistically significant. In order to determine whether all optimistic CEOs exhibit the 
same behaviors, model 2 of table 7 uses separate indicator variables for the three types of 
optimists: Justified Optimists, Unjustified Optimists and Optimists (excluding Justified 
and Unjustified Optimists). As predicted, the estimated betas for these three indicator 
variables are all negative and highly significant: any CEO who believes his firm to be 
undervalued (whether correctly or not) should prefer to maintain his firm’s financial slack 
by retaining dividends. Also as predicted, the estimated beta for the interaction term 
between growth opportunities and the Justified Optimist indicator variable is positive and 
statistically significant; whereas the estimated beta for the interaction term for other 
optimists is not significantly different from zero. The dividend policy of a Justified 
Optimist who is CEO of a growth firm is more similar to that of an unbiased CEO of a 
growth firm as there is less private information not yet reflected in the firm’s market 
price. If all optimistic CEOs were alike then the estimated beta for the interaction 
between optimism and growth opportunities for all optimists would be positive and 
significantly different from zero. However, the estimated betas for the interaction 
between growth opportunities and Unjustified Optimists and Optimists (excluding 
Justified and Unjustified Optimists) are not statistically different from zero, suggesting 
that the dividend policies for these classes of optimists are not more similar to those of 
unbiased CEOs when they manage high growth firms. In other words, there is again 
evidence to suggest that Justified Optimists are distinct from other optimists and that they 
behave like unbiased CEOs, while the other types of optimist do not. 
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OPTIMISM AND TOTAL PAYOUT 
It can be argued that it is inappropriate to only consider dividend payout rather than total 
payout policy as dividend payout does not consider the significant cash amounts returned 
to shareholders through stock repurchases. Furthermore, the personal wealth of CEOs 
with vested options will be impacted in different ways when the firm pays its 
shareholders via dividends rather than via stock purchases. Executive options are 
generally not adjusted for the impact of dividend payments or stock repurchases on the 
underlying stock’s price. When a firm pays a dividend then ceteris paribus the ex-
dividend price will be lower, thereby reducing the value (and ITM) of any associated 
options. On the other hand, when a firm repurchases its own stock, the stock price will 
increase, thereby increasing the value (and ITM) of any associated options. A CEO with 
unexercised options should therefore prefer to return cash to the firm’s shareholders by 
stock repurchases rather than paying dividends. As all optimistic CEOs, by definition, 
have unexercised options, they should prefer stock repurchases to dividend payments. 
The random effects Tobit regression (4) is repeated using total payout ratio rather than 
dividend payout as the dependent variable. For consistency, the total payout ratio is 
calculated as the ratio of the sum of the value of repurchased stock and dividends paid to 
the market value of the firm’s equity. The results are shown in table 8. 
It should be noted that the results are similar to those for regressions of dividend payout: 
all optimists have lower payout ratios but the estimated beta for the interaction term for 
optimism and growth opportunities is only statistically significant for Justified Optimists. 
When the total payout ratio is the dependent variable, the signs and significance of all the 
other explanatory variables are consistent with Deshmukh et al (2013). 
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In summary, analysis of the relationship between payout policy and optimism suggests 
that Justified Optimists are not subject to bias. Although they pay lower dividends than 
CEOs who are not optimists, this is rational if they correctly judge the firm to be 
undervalued and hence that external financing is expensive. Most importantly, the 
“underpayment” of dividends is smaller for firms which the market recognizes as having 
higher growth opportunities. This is not true for other groups of optimists. 
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Table 7 
CEO Optimism and Dividend Policy 
 
Random-effects Tobit regression of factors influencing dividend payout
Model 1 Model 2
CEO Optimism
Optimist -0.006*** x
Justified Optimist x -0.006***
Unjustified Optimist x -0.005***
Optimist (excl. Justified & Unjustified) x -0.005***
Optimist*Growth 0.001* x
Justified Optimist*Growth x 0.001**
Unjustified Optimist*Growth x 0.001
Optimist (excl. Justified & Unjustified)*Growth x 0.000
Firm characteristics
Stock Ownership -0.000 -0.000
Vested Options -0.013 -0.012
Growth opportunities -0.001*** -0.001***
Cash Flow as % assets 0.003 0.004
Firm size (log of total assets) 0.004*** 0.004***
Tangible assets -0.000 -0.000
Year FE yes yes
Industry FE yes yes




15,054 CEO-year observations (excluding finance and utility firms) over the period 1992-2012. Dependent
variable is Dividend Payout , defined as % of market value. Optimist is an indicator variable with a value of
1 if the CEO is an Optimist according to the classification described part II. Justified Optimist is an
indicator variable with a value of 1 if CEO is classified as Justified Optimist due to increasing ITM-ness of
unexercised, exerciseable options, as defined in part V. Unjustified Optimist is an indicator variable with a
value of 1 if CEO is classified as Unjustified Optimist due to increasing ITM-ness of unexercised,
exercisable options as defined in part V. Optimist (excluding Justified /Unjustified) is an indicator variable
with a value of 1 if the CEO is an Optimist but is not a Justified Optimist or Unjustified Optimist .  Cash 
flow is cash flow normalised by total assets, calculated as [oibdp/at]. Growth Opportunities is the ratio of
market value of assets to book value of assets. Stock Ownership is the percentage of company stock held by
the CEO. Vested Options is aggregate number of vested unexercised options held by the executive at fiscal
year end as a percentage of total shares outstanding . Firm size is log of sales. All models include year fixed
effects and Fama-French 49 industry fixed effects and control for firm-level random effects. The table shows
the estimated co-efficient for each explanatory variable. The superscripts ***, ** and * indicate statistical
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 8 
CEO Optimism and Total Payout Policy 
 
Random-effects Tobit regression of factors influencing total payout
Model 1 Model 2
CEO Optimism
Optimist -0.017*** x
Justified Optimist x -0.021***
Unjustified Optimist x -0.013***
Optimist (excl. Justified & Unjustified) x -0.015***
Optimist*Growth 0.002** x
Justified Optimist*Growth x 0.002***
Unjustified Optimist*Growth x 0.001
Optimist (excl. Justified & Unjustified)*Growth x 0.001
Firm characteristics
Stock Ownership -3.1 x10-4*** -3.1 x10-4***
Vested Options 0.139*** -0.140***
Growth Opportunities -0.007*** -0.007***
Cash Flow as % assets 0.135*** 0.135***
Firm size (log of total assets) 0.007*** 0.007***
Tangible assets -0.001* -0.001*
Year FE yes yes
Industry FE yes yes




15,054 CEO-year observations (excluding finance and utility firms) over the period 1992-2012. Dependent
variable is Total Payout Payout , defined as % of market value. Optimist is an indicator variable with a value
of 1 if the CEO is an Optimist according to the classification described part II. Justified Optimist is an
indicator variable with a value of 1 if CEO is classified as Justified Optimist due to increasing ITM-ness of
unexercised, exerciseable options, as defined in part V. Unjustified Optimist is an indicator variable with a
value of 1 if CEO is classified as Unjustified Optimist due to increasing ITM-ness of unexercised,
exercisable options as defined in part V. Optimist (excluding Justified /Unjustified) is an indicator variable
with a value of 1 if the CEO is an Optimist but is not a Justified Optimist or Unjustified Optimist .  Cash 
Flow is cash flow normalised by total assets, calculated as [oibdp/at]. Growth Opportunities is the ratio of
market value of assets to book value of assets. Stock Ownership is the percentage of company stock held by
the CEO. Vested Options is aggregate number of vested unexercised options held by the executive at fiscal
year end as a percentage of total shares outstanding . Firm size is log of sales. All models include year fixed
effects and Fama-French 49 industry fixed effects and control for firm-level random effects. The table shows
the estimated co-efficient for each explanatory variable. The superscripts ***, ** and * indicate statistical
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.




This paper finds that self-attribution helps to explain annual variation in CEO optimism: 
CEO optimism increases more as a result of good firm performance than it decreases as a 
result of poor CEO performance. Furthermore, there is evidence that those CEOs whose 
optimism increases as a result of superior industry-adjusted performance are not subject 
to bias but instead appear to be reacting to their ability or to their firms’ specific 
conditions. The corporate investment and financing decisions of Justified Optimists 
should therefore be no worse, or better, than those of CEOs who are not exhibiting 
optimistic behavior, which is what this paper finds. Justified Optimists invest more than 
unbiased CEOs but their investment decisions are no more sensitive to cash flow than 
those of unbiased CEOs; Justified Optimists are more likely to engage in M&A activity 
but the market reacts positively to this activity; Justified Optimists do pay out lower 
dividends than unbiased CEOs but this difference decreases if the market recognizes a 
firm’s growth opportunities. 
The literature generally treats CEO overconfidence and optimism as a permanent trait and 
the corporate investment and financing decisions associated with CEOs classified as 
overconfident or optimistic are generally treated as inferior to those of CEOs who are not 
classified as overconfident or optimistic. This paper demonstrates that overconfident 
behavior is actually exhibited relatively infrequently by CEOs who are classified as 
permanently overconfident: 57.7% of overconfident CEOs exhibited the characteristic 
behavior in less than 67% of the years where the behavior could be classified. 
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This paper helps to identify when optimistic behavior is likely to be the result of bias and 
when it is likely to be a rational response to a firm’s specific conditions. Identifying 
CEOs whose optimism is justifiable may aid investors in their evaluation of CEO 
decisions and improve capital market efficiency. Identifying CEOs whose optimism is 
not justifiable may aid research into how corporate governance and contracting can 
modify the behaviors of biased CEOs. Lastly, this paper may help CEOs themselves to 
better evaluate their own performance and identify potential biases.  
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